Evans v. Michigan: The Impact of Judicial Error on Double Jeopardy Protection by Shen, Zi-Xiang
SHEN FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)  1/14/2013 9:22 PM 
 
 
EVANS V. MICHIGAN: THE IMPACT 
OF JUDICIAL ERROR ON DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY PROTECTION 
ZI-XIANG SHEN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against 
double jeopardy, the retrying of a criminal defendant for the same 
offense after conviction or acquittal.1 But does the Fifth Amendment 
protect a criminal defendant when a trial judge mistakenly requires 
the prosecution to prove an element that does not exist and, as a 
result, orders a directed verdict in favor of the defendant? The 
Michigan Supreme Court’s answer was a definitive “no,” interpreting 
the double jeopardy protection narrowly and holding that such a 
decision was not an “acquittal” barring retrial.2 Because even 
erroneous acquittals cannot be retried, state courts—wanting to 
preserve the possibility of retrial for public policy reasons—readily 
avoid defining trial rulings as “acquittals.” Strong public policy 
rationales support the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation. The 
validity of these rationales, however, rests on the trial court making a 
legal, rather than a factual, error—a distinction not yet drawn by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In Evans v. Michigan,3 the Court will decide 
whether to recognize such a distinction in judicial rulings for purposes 
of extending double jeopardy protection. 
 
 2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Lisa Kern 
Griffin for her valuable guidance and insight. I also thank Katie McEvilly, Donata Marcantonio, 
Alex Hall, Tara McGrath, Nancy Nguyen, and Sudeep Paul for their thorough edits and 
comments. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 2.  People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 536–37 (Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v. 
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327). 
 3.  Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. argued Nov. 6, 2012). 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 2008, Lamar Evans was arrested in connection with a house 
fire.4 Evans was charged under the Michigan Penal Code with 
“willfully or maliciously” burning “any building or other real 
property.”5 The two arresting police officers testified at Evans’s trial 
that they had observed a house on fire and, upon investigating, saw 
Evans running away from the house with a gasoline can.6 They further 
testified that after apprehending Evans, he confessed to burning down 
the house.7 The fire department’s subsequent arson investigation 
concluded that the fire had been deliberately set.8 At the time of the 
fire, no one lived in the house, and the house lacked utility 
connections.9 However, the owner was in the process of purchasing 
the house and had begun moving in his belongings.10 
The trial judge granted Evans’s motion for a directed verdict 
following the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.11 Evans 
contended that the jury instructions showed that the charged offense 
required, as a necessary element, that the building in question not be 
a dwelling; however, the State’s evidence showed that the building 
was a dwelling.12 The State argued that whether or not the building 
was a dwelling was not an element of the offense—the building just 
had to be a “structure”—and that the jury instructions were only a 
guide.13 The trial judge disagreed with the prosecution, referring to the 
jury instructions as “not a guide” but rather as “what is required by 
law.”14 The judge also read the statutory language to mean that 
because the State charged Evans under “burning other real property” 
and not “burning [a] dwelling house,”15 the State had to prove the 
building was not a dwelling.16 
 
 4.  Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 537. 
 5.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.73 (West 2012). 
 6.  Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 537. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 539. 
 12.  See id. at 537 (describing Evans’s motion for a directed verdict following the close of 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief). 
 13.  Id. at 537–38. 
 14.  Id. at 538. 
 15.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West 2012). 
 16.  See Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 538–39 (quoting the colloquy between the trial judge and 
counsel). 
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The State appealed, seeking to retry Evans.17 The Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling.18 The appellate court 
found it “undisputed”19 that the trial judge had erroneously required 
the State to prove the building was not a dwelling. Furthermore, the 
appellate court concluded that the legal error meant the trial court’s 
ruling was not an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.20 The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.21 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Double Jeopardy Clause Protection Against Retrial Following 
Acquittal 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”22 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed this clause, known as 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, to provide three categorical protections 
for criminal defendants: (1) protection against multiple prosecutions 
for the same offense; (2) protection against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.23 Evans will require 
the Supreme Court to consider the scope of this last protection. 
The Court has long held that an acquittal is final and cannot be 
reviewed without violating a defendant’s constitutional right to be 
protected against double jeopardy.24 According to the Court, “[a]t the 
heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely 
to subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm 
 
 17.  Id. at 539. 
 18.  People v. Evans, 794 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 810 N.W.2d 535 
(Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v. Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) 
(No. 11-1327). 
 19.  Id. at 852. 
 20.  See Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 539 (“[T]he panel concluded that double-jeopardy principles 
did not bar retrial because the trial court had not resolved a factual element necessary to 
establish a conviction.”). 
 21.  Id. at 549. 
 22.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 23.  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see Notes and Comments, Twice in 
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265–66 (1965) (outlining the three central double jeopardy 
prohibitions). 
 24.  See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (“The verdict of acquittal was final, 
and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and 
thereby violating the [C]onstitution.”). 
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Government with a potent instrument of oppression.”25 This double 
jeopardy protection also serves important interests of finality in 
judicial proceedings and the preservation of the integrity of verdicts.26 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has also treated judicial 
acquittals the same as jury acquittals for purposes of double jeopardy 
protection.27 In the central case United States v. Martin Linen Supply 
Co.,28 the Court held that a trial court ruling is an “acquittal” meriting 
double jeopardy protection if it “represents a resolution, correct or 
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”29 In 
that case, the trial court had entered a judgment of acquittal under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after discharging the 
deadlocked jury and determining that the state’s evidence was legally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction.30 The state appealed the judgment, 
but the Fifth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 
appeal because it would allow the defendants to be tried a second 
time.31 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s 
ruling constituted an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes.32 The 
Court emphasized that it was the trial judge’s substantive resolution 
of the charged offense’s factual elements that deemed it an acquittal, 
rather than the label of the ruling.33 
The Court’s emphasis that even erroneous acquittals preclude 
retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause was important to Martin 
 
 25.  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). 
 26.  See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (“[T]he State . . . should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby . . . compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”). 
 27.  See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (“[W]e have long held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed 
acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.”). 
However, as the United States notes, as amicus curiae, this aspect of the Court’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence is somewhat controversial. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. June 11, 
2012) (describing commentators’ observations that “when the Court summarily equated a 
judge’s insufficiency ruling with a jury’s verdict of acquittal, it gave . . . virtually no reason at all 
for that treatment”). 
 28.  430 U.S. 564 (1977). 
 29.  Id. at 571. 
 30.  Id. at 565–66 & nn.2–3. 
 31.  Id. at 567. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See id. at 571 (“[W]hat constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of 
the judge’s action. Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its 
label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of 
the offense charged.”). 
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Linen’s holding and particularly relevant to Evans. Though this 
position has been heavily criticized,34 the Court has continued to 
recognize that the Martin Linen standard applies to a multitude of 
erroneous rulings. In Arizona v. Rumsey,35 the Court held that the trial 
court effectively “acquitted” the defendant of the death penalty by 
misinterpreting the sentencing statute and finding a lack of 
aggravating circumstances; the trial court was thus barred on remand 
from setencing the defendant to death.36 In Smalis v. Pennsylvania,37 
the Court held that a trial court’s grant of defendants’ demurrer 
constituted an acquittal barring retrial.38 Further, the trial court’s 
potentially erroneous requirement that the prosecution show a higher 
degree of recklessness than was statutorily necessary to prove third-
degree murder did not affect the ruling’s status as an acquittal.39 The 
ruling was an acquittal because “[w]hat the demurring defendant 
seeks is a ruling that as a matter of law the State’s evidence is 
insufficient to establish his factual guilt.”40 
More recently, in Smith v. Massachusetts,41 the Court held that a 
trial judge acquitted a defendant of an unlawful firearms possession 
charge when she ruled that the state had not proven a gun barrel was 
less than sixteen inches long, as required by statute, even though the 
judge later orally “reversed” her ruling upon reconsideration of the 
trial testimony.42 According to the Court, the trial judge’s initial ruling 
was final and constituted an acquittal, because it was entered under a 
criminal procedure rule “direct[ing] the trial judge to enter a finding 
of not guilty ‘if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain a conviction.’”43 Whether it was correct or not, the ruling 
 
 34.  E.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[The 
defendant] no more would be put in jeopardy a second time when retried because of a mistake 
of law in his favor, than he would be when retried for a mistake that did him harm.”). 
 35.  467 U.S. 203 (1984). 
 36.  Id. at 211. 
 37.  476 U.S. 140 (1986). 
 38.  See id. at 144 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for purposes of 
considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution’s 
case in chief elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 39.  Id. at 144 n.7. 
 40.  Id. at 144. 
 41.  543 U.S. 462 (2005). 
 42.  See id. at 465–67 (holding that the trial judge’s initial ruling, based on her finding that 
the prosecution had not presented any evidence showing the defendant possessed a weapon 
with a barrel less than sixteen inches long, constituted an acquittal). 
 43.  Id. at 467 (quoting MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)). 
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resolved the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the charge and was 
thus an acquittal.44 
Conversely, the Court’s precedent does provide some guidance on 
when the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial following trial 
court orders that terminate proceedings before a jury verdict is 
rendered. In United States v. Scott,45 the trial court granted the 
defendant’s mid-trial motion to dismiss drug charges based on 
prejudice due to pre-indictment delay.46 The state sought to appeal the 
dismissal, but the Sixth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
barred any further prosecution.47 The Supreme Court reversed, 
distinguishing the case on the basis that there had been no findings as 
to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.48 The Court held that the 
underlying principles and purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
are not implicated where the trial court ruling is unrelated to issues of 
the defendant’s culpability.49 
In the Supreme Court’s last term, it considered the scope of 
double jeopardy protection in the context of a jury trial in Blueford v. 
Arkansas.50 During deliberations in that case, the foreperson reported 
to the trial judge that the jury “was unanimous against guilt on capital 
murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, 
and had not voted on negligent homicide.”51 The jury continued to 
deliberate but was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was 
declared.52 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not 
bar retrial of the defendant on the murder charges.53 In the majority’s 
 
 44.  See id. at 468–69 (applying the Martin Linen standard and holding that “what matters 
is that, as the Massachusetts Rules authorize, the judge evaluated the [Commonwealth’s] 
evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 45.  437 U.S. 82 (1978). 
 46.  Id. at 84. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. at 100–01 (allowing the prosecution to appeal the trial court’s ruling because no 
Double Jeopardy Clause-protected interest has been invaded when “the defendant himself 
seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt 
or innocence”). 
 49.  See id. at 95–96 (deciding that “the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause” are not pertinent to a defendant who seeks termination “not because of his assertion 
that the Government has failed to make out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that 
the Government’s case against him must fail even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 50.  132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012). 
 51.  Id. at 2048. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 2053. 
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view, “the foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of 
anything”54—the defendant was neither convicted nor acquitted of the 
murder charges—and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause did not 
preclude retrial.55 
B. Michigan Supreme Court Holding 
Considering U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as well as the public policy interests involved, the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Evans held that the State was not barred 
from retrying Evans following the trial judge’s misconstruction of the 
criminal statute under which Evans was charged.56 
At the core of the holding was the Michigan Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the trial judge’s ruling did not constitute an acquittal 
warranting protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court 
looked to Martin Linen as the foundation for determining whether a 
ruling is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.57 In particular, the 
court found that Martin Linen set forth the definition of an acquittal 
as “a ruling of the judge, whatever its label, [that] actually represents a 
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the 
offense charged.”58 Because the trial court erroneously required that 
the prosecution establish an element of the charged offense that did 
not actually exist, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial 
court never ruled on any of the factual elements required by statute.59 
Moreover, since the trial court’s ruling was based on this “extraneous 
element,” the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court 
never reached the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.60 
The Michigan Supreme Court distinguished the legal error 
committed in this case from the factual errors in cases that extended 
 
 54.  Id. at 2050. 
 55.  Id. at 2053. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, asserted that 
the majority opinion effectively gave “the State what the Constitution withholds: the proverbial 
second bite at the apple.” Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 548–49 (Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v. 
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327). 
 57.  Id. at 540–41. 
 58.  Id. at 546 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 
(1977)). 
 59.  See id. (agreeing with the court of appeals that because the trial court incorrectly 
added an extra element to the charged offense, it “did not resolve or even address any factual 
element necessary to establish a conviction for burning other real property”). 
 60.  Id. 
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double jeopardy protection.61 According to the court, in Rumsey, 
Smalis, and Smith, the trial courts had made evidentiary errors 
relating to the proof required to establish factual elements of the 
charged offenses.62 Though the court noted that the rulings in those 
cases “were based on the prosecution’s failure to prove something 
that the law did not actually require it to prove,” the “key distinction” 
was that the trial courts in those cases resolved at least one of the 
factual elements of the charged offense.63 In contrast, the trial judge’s 
ruling in Evans’s case was “entirely focused on the extraneous 
element” that the trial judge grafted onto the statutory offense.64 Thus, 
in the court’s view, there was a “constitutionally meaningful 
difference”65 between the post-Martin Linen cases and the current 
case before the court. Here, the trial court’s error effectively 
dismissed the case without resolving any factual elements.66 
The Michigan Supreme Court also discussed the policy concerns 
underlying its holding. Interpreting the outer bounds of “acquittal” 
requires the balancing of two competing interests. The first is the 
State’s “interest in having one full and fair opportunity to prosecute a 
criminal case.”67 This interest weighs in favor of a narrow 
interpretation of “acquittal.” The second is the “interest in protecting 
a criminal defendant from being subjected ‘to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity’” about his adjudication.68 This interest weighs 
in favor of a broader interpretation of “acquittal.” In balancing the 
interests in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the 
public policy interest in allowing the State to present its case weighed 
heavily, while retrying Evans did not invoke the kinds of hazards 
warranting double jeopardy protection.69 As a result, the Michigan 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial 
court ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar 
 
 61.  Id. at 543. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 543 n.39. 
 64.  Id. at 546. 
 65.  Id. at 543. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 548. 
 68.  Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957)). 
 69.  See id. (“[T]he people have not been afforded the opportunity to have their case 
reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence on the factual elements even once. Permitting 
retrial to allow such an opportunity hardly depicts an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a 
defendant . . . .”). 
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Evans’s retrial.70 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Evans’s Argument 
Evans contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State 
from retrying him because the trial court’s judgment of directed 
verdict was an acquittal, despite the legal error involved. First, Evans 
argues that the trial court’s ruling implicates Double Jeopardy Clause 
protection because the court essentially rendered a finding that he 
was not culpable for the charged offense.71 Asserting that Martin 
Linen and Scott “established a bright line between acquittals and 
other judicial decisions terminating a criminal proceeding,”72 Evans 
argues that the ruling clearly resolved the question of his guilt or 
innocence and was thus an acquittal.73 Evans notes that the trial judge 
evaluated the criminal statute, jury instructions and its commentary, 
and the State’s evidence before issuing her ruling.74 Because the trial 
judge found the evidence “legally insufficient to sustain a 
conviction,”75 Evans asserts that “the ruling, correct or not, was 
entirely about [his] innocence of the charged offense.”76 Thus, Evans 
concludes that permitting a retrial would be unconstitutional and 
inconsistent with the Court’s prior holdings in analogous cases. 
Second, Evans argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision 
is an “attempt to carve out an ‘extra element’ exception to the 
definition of ‘acquittal,’” and as such is an unworkable precedent.77 In 
Evans’s view, requiring the State to prove facts to support a 
misconstruction of the law—held sufficient to bar retrial in Rumsey, 
Smalis, and Smith—is functionally equivalent to requiring the State to 
prove an element the trial court added to the statutory requirements.78 
Both errors “increase[] the prosecution’s burden”79 and when either 
such error results in the court terminating trial proceedings, the ruling 
 
 70.  Id. at 548–49. 
 71.  Brief for Petitioner at 9, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Aug. 15, 2012). 
 72.  Id. at 11. 
 73.  See id. at 14 (“The trial judge’s ruling in Petitioner’s case was manifestly on the ‘guilt 
or innocence’ side of the line drawn in Scott and Martin Linen.”). 
 74.  Id. at 14–15. 
 75.  Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977)). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 20. 
 78.  Id. at 27. 
 79.  Id. 
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constitutes an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.80 Evans further contends that upholding the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s “extra element” exception would “seriously 
undermine the core Double Jeopardy Clause protection against post-
acquittal proceedings,”81 opening the door to prosecutorial appeals 
every time a trial judge orders a mid-trial directed verdict based on 
legal interpretations with which the prosecution disagrees.82 The 
prosecution could characterize the judge’s interpretation as the 
addition of an extra, non-existent element, thereby forcing appellate 
courts to review the decision, and thus undermining the finality of 
proceedings for already-tried defendants.83 
B. State’s Argument 
The State argues that the trial judge’s legal error at Evans’s trial 
was not an acquittal barring retrial. According to the State, this case is 
fundamentally distinguishable from Martin Linen and successive case 
law, because the errors in those cases affected the factual resolution of 
the charged offense.84 The error here, by contrast, precluded the judge 
or jury from resolving any of the factual elements required by 
statute.85 In the State’s view, requiring that the structure burned be a 
dwelling is “no more related to ‘factual guilt or innocence’ of the 
offense charged than a requirement that the structure burned be 
blue.”86 Because the trial judge required the prosecution to prove 
something that was indisputably not an element87 and because this 
error provided the basis for the judge’s ruling, the State argues that 
the ruling cannot be characterized as an acquittal.88 
 
 80.  See id. at 27–28 (“[T]he fundamental Double Jeopardy Clause bar on further 
proceedings cannot turn on such a distinction.”). 
 81.  Id. at 28. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See id. (“Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having 
an end to the proceedings against him.” (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 
(1986))). 
 84.  See Brief for the Respondent at 13–14, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
2012) (arguing that under the Martin Linen test, a judicial resolution based on “something other 
than one or more of the constituent parts of the crime charged . . . is not an acquittal, and 
jeopardy does not bar appeal and retrial”). 
 85.  Id. at 24. 
 86.  Id. at 16–17. 
 87.  See id. at 6 (“The trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under 
which the Petitioner was charged, and terminated the trial . . . by finding an absence of proof on 
this extraneous or faux element . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 88.  Id. at 9. 
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The State’s brief also appeals to the policy justifications for the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and contends that they are not present in 
this case. At the outset, the State notes that the ruling resulted from 
Evans’s motion seeking termination of the trial proceedings and 
argues that as a result “[t]he case involves no attempt to harass the 
defendant through repeated prosecutions, as all the State seeks is one 
full and fair opportunity to have the case decided by a jury.”89 
According to the State, the double jeopardy hazards of a powerful 
state oppressing an individual are simply not present in Evans’s case.90 
In the State’s view, adopting Evans’s position effectively “turns the 
storied protections of the Jeopardy Clause into a parlor trick.”91 
V. ANALYSIS 
In order for Evans to prevail, he needs to convince the Court that 
the trial court’s legal error in his case is no different from the factual 
errors in other decisions that were held to be unreviewable acquittals 
warranting double jeopardy protection. In addition to examining the 
contours of Martin Linen and its successive cases, the Court is likely 
to consider the competing public policy issues involved. On one side is 
the fundamental protection the Constitution provides to defendants 
whose guilt the state fails to prove from being tried twice for the same 
offense92 and the public interest in finality in judicial proceedings. On 
the other side is the need for proper adjudication in criminal trials 
and the arguable lack of double jeopardy dangers. In light of the 
Court’s long-standing precedent recognizing Double Jeopardy Clause 
protection even in incorrect judicial resolutions, the State faces an 
uphill battle. 
However, even if the Court finds for Evans, it most likely did not 
grant certiorari simply to reverse the Michigan Supreme Court and 
 
 89.  Id. at 5–6. 
 90.  See id. at 55 (“[W]here the government appeals in this situation ‘the state is not 
attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials . . . . This is 
not cruelty at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree.’” (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937))). More broadly, the State urges the Supreme Court to reconsider its 
treatment of judicial acquittals as functionally equivalent to jury acquittals for double jeopardy 
purposes. See id. at 35 (arguing that “reconsideration of the foundations of Martin Linen is 
appropriate” in light of the historical common law origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
 91.  Id. at 33. 
 92.  See Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2012) (“The error 
was not [Evans’s]; he merely asked the judge to declare his lack of guilt, which the judge did.”). 
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correct a perceived error.93 Rather, the Court may clarify the scope of 
Martin Linen’s standard, especially since the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s decision was the latest in a number of lower court opinions 
concluding that Martin Linen does not apply to particular legal errors 
committed by trial courts.94 
The Court will likely hold the trial judge’s ruling to be an 
acquittal. Procedurally, there is very little difference between the 
specific legal error committed in Evans’s trial and the errors at issue 
in the Martin Linen line of cases. In Evans’s trial, the judge issued her 
ruling under Michigan Court Rule 6.419(A), enabling the court to 
“direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense as to which the 
evidence is insufficient to support conviction” after the close of the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief.95 In Smith, the Supreme Court looked to 
similar procedural language to support its conclusion that the trial 
judge’s ruling was indeed an acquittal.96 The trial court in that case 
had ruled under Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a), 
directing a finding of not guilty following the close of the 
prosecution’s case “if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain a conviction.”97 The Court held that the trial court’s order met 
the Martin Linen definition of an acquittal “consistently used in our 
double-jeopardy cases.”98 
Additionally, the Court faces the potential of setting uncertain 
precedent if it were to recognize an exception in its double jeopardy 
jurisprudence for the erroneous ruling in Evans’s case. If the Court 
agrees with the Michigan Supreme Court that the trial judge’s ruling 
 
 93.  See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging 
versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 272 (2006) 
(discussing “the Court’s long struggle to control its caseload to avoid being (or being viewed as) 
a court whose primary role is to correct errors made by lower courts”). 
 94.  The Third Circuit, citing other circuits, asserted that the Martin Linen test “require[s] 
an acquittal only when, in terminating the proceeding, the trial court actually resolves in favor 
of the defendant a factual element necessary for a criminal conviction.” United States v. Maker, 
751 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1984). Under this interpretation, the court concluded that a trial 
court’s dismissal of an indictment did not constitute an acquittal because it was based on the 
court’s legally erroneous determination that the indictment’s allegations were insufficient. Id. at 
623–24. More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the state was not barred from 
retrying a defendant following a directed verdict of acquittal, because the ruling was legally, not 
factually, erroneous: the magistrate judge had required the state to prove a legitimate reason for 
asking the defendant to leave public property, when the statute did not contain such an element. 
See State v. Korsen, 69 P.3d 126, 136–37 (Idaho 2003). 
 95.  MICH. CT. R. 6.419(A). 
 96.  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467–68 (2005). 
 97.  MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). 
 98.  Smith, 543 U.S. at 467–68. 
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was not an acquittal, it would essentially create an exception not just 
for a misinterpretation of law, but a particular kind of 
misinterpretation. After all, the Court has declined to recognize 
exceptions for trial court errors such as misinterpretations of 
statutory definitions,99 capital sentencing law,100 and witness 
testimony.101 The Court has not demonstrated a willingness to carve 
out such a fact-intensive exception as it would need to in Evans. 
Instead, the wide range of erroneous rulings foreclosing retrial 
reflects the Court’s hesitation to withhold double jeopardy protection 
from defendants whom courts have found innocent. 
Moreover, as a policy matter, if the Court were to uphold the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling, the decision may open the door to 
all manner of unpredictable double jeopardy exceptions. Perhaps the 
standard would be fairly easy to apply in circumstances such as this, 
where the trial judge announces (incorrectly) the precise element she 
has read into the criminal statute and believes the prosecution has 
failed to prove. However, in less clear-cut cases, affirming the 
Michigan Supreme Court could create more confusion in the Court’s 
already fraught double jeopardy jurisprudence.102 The Court would 
need to proceed carefully, identifying the specific requirements that 
distinguish a judicial decision from one that substantively “represents 
a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of 
the offense charged.”103 For example, would a new rule only apply 
when, as in this case, neither party disputes that a factual element the 
prosecution was required to prove was actually not part of the 
statutory offense? While attaching such limitations may lend clarity, it 
would likely raise the question of how useful such a cabined rule 
would be. Lower courts would also likely find an “extra element” legal 
error exemption to double jeopardy protection difficult to apply, 
 
 99.  See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 141, 144 n.7 (1986) (extending double 
jeopardy protection even though the trial court may have required the incorrect level of 
recklessness); see also supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 100.  See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 205 (1984) (extending double jeapardy 
protection even though the trial court misinterpreted the requirements for an aggravating 
circumstance for capital sentencing); see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 101.  See Smith, 543 U.S. at 465 (extending double jeopardy protection even though the trial 
court misjudged the adequacy of the witness’s testimony in proving one of the elements); see 
also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 102.  See, e.g., William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. 
REV. 411, 465–66 (1993) (discussing the complicated case law behind the Double Jeopardy 
Clause’s protection against multiple prosecutions for the same offense). 
 103.  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). 
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especially in cases involving erroneous rulings that fall somewhere in 
the spectrum between Evans and the Martin Linen line of cases. 
Ultimately, following the Martin Linen standard, the distinction that 
should matter to the Court is whether the trial judge decided on the 
defendant’s culpability (either legal or factual).104 
Granted, there is an uneasy quality to the factual circumstances of 
this case, as one may sense that Evans is not the kind of defendant the 
Double Jeopardy Clause aims to protect. The undercurrent of the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s holding is that prohibiting the State from 
retrying Evans serves no strong public policy interest, but rather, 
harms the public interest.105 This discomfort with extending Double 
Jeopardy Clause protection in the wake of the particular legal error 
committed reflects the criticism of one constitutional scholar: “We do 
not demand that the defendant go free because the initial jurors catch 
fever and a new trial is ordered; why should things be any different if 
a fevered judge makes egregiously wrong legal rulings at trial?”106 
While the Court will be concerned about eroding the Double 
Jeopardy Clause’s fundamental protections, not allowing retrial in this 
case could arguably present just such an erosion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though compelling public policy justifications support the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the State faces an 
uphill battle in the appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court. Many 
Supreme Court decisions have extended double jeopardy protection 
in cases of erroneous acquittals, and the State will need to persuade 
the Court that the erroneous path taken to end Evans’s trial is 
definitively distinguishable from those cases. The State’s task may 
prove to be insurmountable. Though the circumstances of this case do 
not provide a particularly strong illustration of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause’s necessity and justifications, the Court is nonetheless likely to 
 
 104.  See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not protect a defendant who seeks to terminate trial proceedings “without any 
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence”). 
 105.  See People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 548 (Mich. 2012) cert. granted sub nom. Evans v. 
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327) (“[A] court’s adding an extraneous 
element and resolving the case solely on the basis of that added element prevents any 
evaluation of the charged crime on the merits and thus completely thwarts society’s interest in 
allowing the prosecution one full and fair opportunity to present its case.”). 
 106.  Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1845 
(1997). 
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find that Evans’s culpability has been decided. Upholding the decision 
would require the Court to articulate a substantive difference 
between legally and factually erroneous trial court rulings, a 
distinction with scant foundation in the Court’s double jeopardy 
jurisprudence thus far. 
 
